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TURKEY: Resistance to the Constitution

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//Opposition to the draft constitution unveiled on Tuesday is likely to increase, but the ruling generals probably will go ahead with plans to hold a referendum on it on 7 November.// [redacted]

//The final version of the constitution retains the major articles of the draft prepared by the constituent assembly, but the press is already remarking on its more restrictive nature. Former Prime Minister and Justice Party leader Demirel has privately stated his opposition to the constitution, based on his reading of an earlier draft. He joined former Republican People's Party chief Ecevit in opposing the document. General Evren yesterday decreed that public debate of the constitution will no longer be permitted.// [redacted]

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Comment: //The ban on political activity by former political leaders for 10 years is especially likely to come under heavy criticism in Western Europe. Publication of the draft probably will accelerate the movement to oust Turkey from the Council of Europe and will jeopardize further economic credits from the EC and OECD.// [redacted]

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//Until recently, Demirel had given qualified support to the military regime. His opposition to the proposed constitution suggests it may be voted down next month, provided he and other politicians are willing to ignore the military's prohibition on debate and mobilize public sentiment against it.// [redacted]

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//The generals are likely to try to mute domestic criticism by appealing to the national interest and probably will mount a public relations campaign to win popular support. If the draft fails to obtain widespread approval, however, the regime's timetable for returning power to the civilians by the spring of 1984 may be set back.// [redacted]

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DENMARK: Opposition to INF Funding

//The apparent decision by the opposition Social Democrats to join the movement to withhold Denmark's contribution to NATO's INF infrastructure funding could mean that a parliamentary majority will vote to block payment of the funds.// 25X1

//Earlier this month the Socialist People's Party, the Left Socialist Party, and the Radical Liberals followed the example of the Norwegian Labor Party in calling for the suspension of further contributions to NATO earmarked for INF. Former Social Democratic Prime Minister Joergensen announced last Friday his party would support a formal proposal by the three smaller parties to withhold Denmark's $1.7 million contribution as long as resistance appears to be growing in the countries designated for deployment.//

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Comment: //The Social Democrats are trying to regain the support of leftwing antidefense forces in the party. If they make good on Joergensen's threat, it will represent at least a symbolic break in the multiyear defense agreement that was painstakingly constructed in 1981 among the major political parties. Pragmatists in the party, however, probably will resist such a move.// 25X1

//A bill blocking the contribution could reach parliament in the next two weeks. The Social Democrats, however, may seek to postpone the debate until the Dutch and Belgian Governments decide whether to go ahead with preparations for missile deployment.// 25X1

//Denmark's share of the INF funding is small, and it is unclear how it could be withheld from Copenhagen's overall NATO contribution. Even if the parliament withheld the money, NATO's missile deployment schedule probably would not be delayed.// 25X1

//On the other hand, a negative Danish decision could encourage INF opponents in other countries to increase their activities. The opposition Labor Party in the Netherlands has been monitoring the infrastructure problem, and interim Foreign Minister van Agt reportedly fears the issue could arise during debates on the budget in January.//

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CHAD: Habre's Slow Progress

President Habre is gaining wider acceptance in Africa but his position could be undermined by his lack of external aid, difficulty in establishing a national unity government, and the increasing chances of new Libyan meddling.

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//Habre's participation in the recent Franco-African summit in Zaire marked his acceptance as head of state, and last week he received official recognition from Nigeria.

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Comment: Habre is unlikely to gain further recognition in Africa and much-needed Western economic aid, particularly French budgetary assistance, until he forms a genuine government of national unity. The President's recent calls for Libya to withdraw from the Aozou Strip may be aimed at rallying domestic support, but they risk provoking more Libyan meddling. If Habre pushes the Aozou issue or attacks Chadian dissidents in Gouro, Libyan leader Qadhafi could decide that force is necessary.

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ECUADOR: President Under Fire

President Hurtado's effort to mollify international lenders by imposing austerity measures last week has resulted in violent demonstrations, a 24-hour general strike today,

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The US Embassy reports the President's lifting of subsidies on wheat and gasoline and planned tax increases have met with almost unanimous opposition among businessmen, students, labor, and congress. In addition, last night Hurtado imposed a state of emergency, establishing a curfew and suspending constitutional rights.

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Comment: The scope and intensity of the reaction, which at least temporarily unites traditional rivals in the labor movement and elsewhere, presents Hurtado with his most serious challenge to date. It also plays into the hands of his rivals in congress, where his government recently lost the support of a major party.

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USSR-POLAND: Comments on the Polish Party

A recent article in *Izvestiya*, noting the large decline in membership in the Polish Communist Party since August 1980, stresses the need to rebuild the party and reestablish its authority. Although the article acknowledges only one new member is being admitted for every 10 lost, it asserts the new members are "real, convinced" Communists, unlike the "careerists, opportunists, and revisionists" who have left. It does not mention Premier Jaruzelski.

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Comment: Soviet commentary repeatedly has implied that Moscow would like to see more progress in preparing the Polish party to resume its leading role. The appearance of this article so soon after the banning of Solidarity indicates such progress may now be the USSR's first priority for Poland. The stress on quality over quantity suggests the Soviets would like a rigorous purge of the party's 2.5 million nominal members, down 22 percent since August 1980. Moscow appears dissatisfied with Jaruzelski's efforts in this area.

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USSR - EASTERN EUROPE: Possible Delay of CEMA Summit

Continued disagreements over an agenda appear to rule out a meeting of party chiefs from CEMA countries at least until next spring. Soviet and East European officials say the USSR is seeking agreement on measures, including changes in CEMA statutes, that would increase the USSR's influence over economic planning and coordination. The East Europeans are resisting.

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Comment: Moscow probably believes a larger Soviet voice in the economic planning by other CEMA members and a greater role in enforcing agreements within CEMA is necessary to deal with Eastern Europe's and the USSR's economic problems. The East European countries want to protect the economic and political autonomy they have, however, and each has very different objectives. Any consensus that emerges in preparatory talks probably will fall far short of Soviet objectives.

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OPEC: Ministerial Meeting Canceled

//OPEC has dropped plans for a consultative meeting of all Oil Ministers that had been slated for 28 October in Vienna.

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Comment: The OPEC governments do not want to appear disunited as happened last July when the extraordinary meeting of OPEC Ministers ended with no consensus and open recriminations. Ministers also may believe that demand for OPEC oil is rising again--sales in September reached about 19 million barrels per day, almost 1 million barrels per day more than in August--and that increasing revenues will make it easier to settle their differences at the next regular ministerial meeting in December.

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MAURITIUS: Government Crisis

The resignation of Foreign Minister Berenger, the most powerful leader in the four-month-old leftist regime, is provoking a government crisis that could result in new elections. Berenger resigned when his heavyhanded attempts to force through an austerity budget and enhance his own authority caused friction between his Mauritian Militant Movement and its smaller Socialist Party allies and within the Movement itself. 25X1

Comment: New parliamentary elections are virtually assured if Berenger does not rejoin the cabinet. They would end the current coalition and might provide radicals an opportunity to increase their influence in the Movement, which is almost certain to continue to dominate the political scene. Failure to carry out Berenger's austerity measures would jeopardize Mauritian access to badly needed IMF assistance. 25X1

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